Abstract

Studies of collective action in commons dilemmas in social-ecological systems typically focus on scenarios in which actors all share symmetric (or similar) positions in relation to the common-pool resource. Many common social-ecological systems do not meet these criteria, most notably, irrigation systems. Participants in irrigation systems must solve two related collective action problems: 1) the provisioning of physical infrastructure necessary to utilize the resource (water), and 2) the asymmetric common-pool resource dilemma where the relative positions of "head-enders" and "tail-enders" generate asymmetric access to the resource itself (water). In times of scarcity, head-enders have an incentive to not share water with tail-enders. Likewise, tail-enders have an incentive to not provide labor to maintain the system if they do not receive water. These interdependent incentives may induce a cooperative outcome under favorable conditions. However, how robust is this system of interdependent incentives in the presence of environmental variability that generates uncertainty about water availability either through variation in the water supply itself or through shocks to infrastructure? This paper reports on results from laboratory experiments designed to address this question.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)166-176
Number of pages11
JournalEcological Economics
Volume93
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

Fingerprint

collective action
incentive
irrigation
irrigation system
water resource
infrastructure
resource
water availability
labor
water supply
water
Collective action
Incentives
Irrigation
Water
Water resources
Common pool resources
Social-ecological systems

Keywords

  • Collective action
  • Commons dilemmas
  • Experiments
  • Irrigation
  • Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Environmental Science(all)

Cite this

Environmental variability and collective action : Experimental insights from an irrigation game. / Anderies, John; Janssen, Marcus; Lee, Allen; Wasserman, Hannah.

In: Ecological Economics, Vol. 93, 2013, p. 166-176.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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