Abstract
This paper considers the incentive to uncover potential future social costs of activities having no historical precedents. Since ex ante markets in the future external effects of historically unique activities are non-existent, the private incentives to uncover the possibility of "Thalidomide-type" results in such activities is weak. The paper discusses the value of sequentially determined environmental bonds as mechanisms for the generation of research funds in these cases, and derives measures for the calculation of such bonds.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 95-110 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Ecological Economics |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 1989 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Environmental Science
- Economics and Econometrics