"Entanglement" and the Exploitation of Common Pool Resources: A Quantum Solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma

Robert Mamada, Charles Perrings

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The overexploitation of common pool resources is frequently associated with open access regimes in which each resource user operates independently of all other resource users. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma. Restricted access regimes of the sort identified by Ostrom and colleagues typically ensure that individual resource users do not operate independently. Taking a quantum approach to the theory of games, we argue that the institutional arrangements involved in common pool resource management imply the "entanglement"of the strategies of resource users. For a very simple case-two firms exploiting a common pool fishery-we show that there exists an "entanglement"mechanism that assures the cooperative outcome.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number2150009
JournalInternational Game Theory Review
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2021

Keywords

  • Common pool resources
  • dynamic cournot competition
  • entanglement
  • prisoners dilemma
  • quantum games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Computer Science(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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