@article{a5bb1b4470104b2b86ea9c8ec6185bfd,
title = "English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem",
abstract = "We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.",
keywords = "Auction theory, Global univalence, International trade, Monotone comparative statics",
author = "Juan Dubra and Federico Echenique and Alejandro Manelli",
note = "Funding Information: ✩ The results in this paper were circulated earlier as two separate papers: “Minimal Assumptions for Efficiency in Asymmetric English auctions,” by Dubra, and “Comparative Statics, English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem,” by Echenique and Manelli. We thank Rabah Amir, Sergei Izmalkov, Vijay Krishna, Preston McAfee, Peter Neary, John Quah, Kevin Reffett, and Chris Shannon for useful comments. Manelli{\textquoteright}s research was partially supported by NSF grants SES-0095524 and SES-0241373. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: dubraj@um.edu.uy (J. Dubra), fede@caltech.edu (F. Echenique), ale@asu.edu (A.M. Manelli). URLs: http://www2.um.edu.uy/dubraj/ (J. Dubra), http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~fede/ (F. Echenique), http://econ00.wpcarey.asu.edu/ (A.M. Manelli).",
year = "2009",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.001",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "144",
pages = "825--849",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "2",
}