English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique, Alejandro Manelli

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)825-849
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume144
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2009

Fingerprint

Stolper-Samuelson theorem
English auction
Ex post equilibrium
Factors
Interdependent valuations

Keywords

  • Auction theory
  • Global univalence
  • International trade
  • Monotone comparative statics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. / Dubra, Juan; Echenique, Federico; Manelli, Alejandro.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 144, No. 2, 03.2009, p. 825-849.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Dubra, Juan ; Echenique, Federico ; Manelli, Alejandro. / English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2009 ; Vol. 144, No. 2. pp. 825-849.
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