Embodied meaning and negative priming

Arthur M. Glenberg, David A. Robertson, Michael P. Kaschak, Alan J. Malter

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Standard models of cognition are built from abstract, amodal, arbitrary symbols, and the meanings of those symbols are given solely by their interrelations. The target article (Glenberg 1997t) argues that these models must be inadequate because meaning cannot arise from relations among abstract symbols. For cognitive representations to be meaningful they must, at the least, be grounded; but abstract symbols are difficult, if not impossible, to ground. As an alternative, the target article developed a framework in which representations are grounded in perception and action, and hence are embodied. Recent work (Glenberg & Robertson 1999; 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak 2002; Kaschak & Glenberg 2000) extends this framework to language.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)644-648
Number of pages5
JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume26
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2003
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
  • Physiology
  • Behavioral Neuroscience

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