Efficient market design and public goods, part I: Economic models

David Toomey, William D. Schulze, Robert Thomas, James S. Thorp, Daniel Tylavsky, Richard E. Schuler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The theory used by economists to support restructuring of the electric power industry has ignored several important technological constraints and public goods that affect the way in which power is delivered. Similarly, engineers, by using security-constrained optimization to incorporate the demand for reliability, have failed to properly define the economic problem. In this two-part paper we attempt to remedy the deficiencies of both the economists' approach and the security-constrained optimization approach through a collaboration of economists and engineers to examine the theoretical properties of a networked power system that provides optimal resource allocation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number4
JournalInternational Journal of Emerging Electric Power Systems
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010

Fingerprint

Constrained optimization
Engineers
Economics
Resource allocation
Industry

Keywords

  • Electric power markets
  • Power system economics
  • Private goods
  • Public goods

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology

Cite this

Efficient market design and public goods, part I : Economic models. / Toomey, David; Schulze, William D.; Thomas, Robert; Thorp, James S.; Tylavsky, Daniel; Schuler, Richard E.

In: International Journal of Emerging Electric Power Systems, Vol. 11, No. 1, 4, 2010.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Toomey, David ; Schulze, William D. ; Thomas, Robert ; Thorp, James S. ; Tylavsky, Daniel ; Schuler, Richard E. / Efficient market design and public goods, part I : Economic models. In: International Journal of Emerging Electric Power Systems. 2010 ; Vol. 11, No. 1.
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