TY - JOUR
T1 - "Economic man" in cross-cultural perspective
T2 - Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
AU - Henrich, Joseph
AU - Boyd, Robert
AU - Bowles, Samuel
AU - Camerer, Colin
AU - Fehr, Ernst
AU - Gintis, Herbert
AU - McElreath, Richard
AU - Alvard, Michael
AU - Barr, Abigail
AU - Ensminger, Jean
AU - Henrich, Natalie Smith
AU - Hill, Kim
AU - Gil-White, Francisco
AU - Gurven, Michael
AU - Marlowe, Frank W.
AU - Patton, John Q.
AU - Tracer, David
PY - 2005/12
Y1 - 2005/12
N2 - Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model - based on self-interest - fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life.
AB - Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model - based on self-interest - fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life.
KW - Altruism
KW - Cooperation
KW - Cross-cultural research
KW - Experimental economics
KW - Game theory
KW - Public goods game
KW - Self-interest
KW - Ultimatum game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33644857852&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33644857852&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0140525X05000142
DO - 10.1017/S0140525X05000142
M3 - Comment/debate
C2 - 16372952
AN - SCOPUS:33644857852
SN - 0140-525X
VL - 28
SP - 795
EP - 815
JO - Behavioral and Brain Sciences
JF - Behavioral and Brain Sciences
IS - 6
ER -