TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamically consistent voting rules
AU - Chandrasekher, Madhav
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2015/12/1
Y1 - 2015/12/1
N2 - This paper studies preference aggregation in a dynamic choice context. Voters face menus of options in stages and the source of dynamics is that menus possibly get smaller across each stage. We call the family of stage voting rules "dynamic voting rules" and provide an axiomatic characterization, on the domain of single-peaked preferences, of dynamic voting rules that are strategy-proof and satisfy a second property, inspired from choice theory, which we call dynamic consistency.
AB - This paper studies preference aggregation in a dynamic choice context. Voters face menus of options in stages and the source of dynamics is that menus possibly get smaller across each stage. We call the family of stage voting rules "dynamic voting rules" and provide an axiomatic characterization, on the domain of single-peaked preferences, of dynamic voting rules that are strategy-proof and satisfy a second property, inspired from choice theory, which we call dynamic consistency.
KW - Aggregation of preferences
KW - Dynamic consistency
KW - Strategy-proofness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84941907337&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.012
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.012
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84941907337
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 160
SP - 175
EP - 187
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
ER -