Dynamically consistent voting rules

Madhav Chandrasekher

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies preference aggregation in a dynamic choice context. Voters face menus of options in stages and the source of dynamics is that menus possibly get smaller across each stage. We call the family of stage voting rules "dynamic voting rules" and provide an axiomatic characterization, on the domain of single-peaked preferences, of dynamic voting rules that are strategy-proof and satisfy a second property, inspired from choice theory, which we call dynamic consistency.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number4477
Pages (from-to)175-187
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume160
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015

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Voting rules
Menu
Preference aggregation
Axiomatic characterization
Strategy-proof
Voters
Dynamic choice
Dynamic consistency
Choice theory
Single-peaked preferences

Keywords

  • Aggregation of preferences
  • Dynamic consistency
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Dynamically consistent voting rules. / Chandrasekher, Madhav.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 160, 4477, 01.12.2015, p. 175-187.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Chandrasekher, Madhav. / Dynamically consistent voting rules. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2015 ; Vol. 160. pp. 175-187.
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