Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic

Marcus Janssen, Robert L. Goldstone

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

31 Scopus citations

Abstract

The evolution of cooperation is possible with a simple model of a population of agents that can move between groups. The agents play public good games within their group. The relative fitness of individuals within the whole population affects their number of offspring. Groups of cooperators evolve but over time are invaded by defectors which eventually results in the group's extinction. However, for small levels of migration and mutation, high levels of cooperation evolve at the population level. Thus, evolution of cooperation based on individual fitness without kin selection, indirect or direct reciprocity is possible. We provide an analysis of the parameters that affect cooperation, and describe the dynamics and distribution of population sizes over time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)134-142
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
Volume243
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 7 2006

Keywords

  • Evolution of cooperation
  • Group structure
  • Public good games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

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