TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic
AU - Janssen, Marcus
AU - Goldstone, Robert L.
N1 - Funding Information:
Many useful comments and suggestions were provided by Neil Bearden, Filippo Menczer, Elinor Ostrom, Michael Wade, and an anonymous reviewer. This research was funded by National Science Foundation Grants BCS-0432894 and 052792, and Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences Grant R305H050116.
PY - 2006/11/7
Y1 - 2006/11/7
N2 - The evolution of cooperation is possible with a simple model of a population of agents that can move between groups. The agents play public good games within their group. The relative fitness of individuals within the whole population affects their number of offspring. Groups of cooperators evolve but over time are invaded by defectors which eventually results in the group's extinction. However, for small levels of migration and mutation, high levels of cooperation evolve at the population level. Thus, evolution of cooperation based on individual fitness without kin selection, indirect or direct reciprocity is possible. We provide an analysis of the parameters that affect cooperation, and describe the dynamics and distribution of population sizes over time.
AB - The evolution of cooperation is possible with a simple model of a population of agents that can move between groups. The agents play public good games within their group. The relative fitness of individuals within the whole population affects their number of offspring. Groups of cooperators evolve but over time are invaded by defectors which eventually results in the group's extinction. However, for small levels of migration and mutation, high levels of cooperation evolve at the population level. Thus, evolution of cooperation based on individual fitness without kin selection, indirect or direct reciprocity is possible. We provide an analysis of the parameters that affect cooperation, and describe the dynamics and distribution of population sizes over time.
KW - Evolution of cooperation
KW - Group structure
KW - Public good games
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.012
DO - 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.012
M3 - Article
C2 - 16872637
AN - SCOPUS:33749055509
SN - 0022-5193
VL - 243
SP - 134
EP - 142
JO - Journal of Theoretical Biology
JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology
IS - 1
ER -