Duality in procurement design

Alejandro Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Finding an optimal mechanism in a standard adverse selection model is equivalent to solving an infinite dimensional linear program. We begin with certain feasible mechanisms-those implemented by auctions, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and combinations of these polar mechanisms-and search for the environments that make them optimal. We prove the optimality of each mechanism using the dual program.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)411-428
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume40
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2004

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Keywords

  • Auctions
  • Bargaining
  • Duality
  • Linear programming
  • Mechanism design
  • Procurement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

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