Duality in procurement design

Alejandro Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Finding an optimal mechanism in a standard adverse selection model is equivalent to solving an infinite dimensional linear program. We begin with certain feasible mechanisms-those implemented by auctions, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and combinations of these polar mechanisms-and search for the environments that make them optimal. We prove the optimality of each mechanism using the dual program.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)411-428
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume40
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2004

Fingerprint

Duality
Adverse Selection
Selection Model
Auctions
Linear Program
Optimality
Design
Procurement

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • Bargaining
  • Duality
  • Linear programming
  • Mechanism design
  • Procurement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Duality in procurement design. / Manelli, Alejandro; Vincent, Daniel R.

In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 40, No. 3-4, 06.2004, p. 411-428.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Manelli, Alejandro ; Vincent, Daniel R. / Duality in procurement design. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2004 ; Vol. 40, No. 3-4. pp. 411-428.
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