Double helix and RAVEN: A system for cyber fault tolerance and recovery

Michele Co, Jack W. Davidson, Jason D. Hiser, John C. Knight, Anh Nguyen-Tuong, Westley Weimer, Jonathan Burket, Gregory L. Frazier, Tiffany M. Frazier, Bruno Dutertre, Ian Mason, Natarajan Shankar, Stephanie Forrest

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Cyber security research has produced numerous artificial diversity techniques such as address space layout randomization, heap randomization, instruction-set randomization, and instruction location randomization. To be most effective, these techniques must be high entropy and secure from information leakage which, in practice, is often difficult to achieve. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that well-funded, determined adversaries can often circumvent these defenses. To allow use of low-entropy diversity, prevent information leakage, and provide provable security against attacks, previvous research proposed using low-entropy but carefully structured articial diversity to create variants of an application and then run these constructed variants within a fault- tolerant environment that runs each variant in parallel and cross check results to detect and mitigate faults. If the variants are carefully constructed, it is possible to prove that certain classes of attack are not possible. This paper presents an overview and status of a cyber fault tolerant system that uses a low overhead multi-variant execution en- vironment and precise static binary analysis and efficient writing technology to produce structured variants which allow automated verification techniques to prove security properties of the system. Preliminary results are presented which demonstrate that the system is capable of detecting unknown faults and mitigating attacks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISRC 2016
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
ISBN (Electronic)9781450337526
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 5 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISRC 2016 - Oak Ridge, United States
Duration: Apr 5 2016Apr 7 2016

Other

Other11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISRC 2016
CountryUnited States
CityOak Ridge
Period4/5/164/7/16

Fingerprint

Fault tolerance
Entropy
Recovery

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Information Systems
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Co, M., Davidson, J. W., Hiser, J. D., Knight, J. C., Nguyen-Tuong, A., Weimer, W., ... Forrest, S. (2016). Double helix and RAVEN: A system for cyber fault tolerance and recovery. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISRC 2016 [2897805] Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1145/2897795.2897805

Double helix and RAVEN : A system for cyber fault tolerance and recovery. / Co, Michele; Davidson, Jack W.; Hiser, Jason D.; Knight, John C.; Nguyen-Tuong, Anh; Weimer, Westley; Burket, Jonathan; Frazier, Gregory L.; Frazier, Tiffany M.; Dutertre, Bruno; Mason, Ian; Shankar, Natarajan; Forrest, Stephanie.

Proceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISRC 2016. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2016. 2897805.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Co, M, Davidson, JW, Hiser, JD, Knight, JC, Nguyen-Tuong, A, Weimer, W, Burket, J, Frazier, GL, Frazier, TM, Dutertre, B, Mason, I, Shankar, N & Forrest, S 2016, Double helix and RAVEN: A system for cyber fault tolerance and recovery. in Proceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISRC 2016., 2897805, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISRC 2016, Oak Ridge, United States, 4/5/16. https://doi.org/10.1145/2897795.2897805
Co M, Davidson JW, Hiser JD, Knight JC, Nguyen-Tuong A, Weimer W et al. Double helix and RAVEN: A system for cyber fault tolerance and recovery. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISRC 2016. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. 2016. 2897805 https://doi.org/10.1145/2897795.2897805
Co, Michele ; Davidson, Jack W. ; Hiser, Jason D. ; Knight, John C. ; Nguyen-Tuong, Anh ; Weimer, Westley ; Burket, Jonathan ; Frazier, Gregory L. ; Frazier, Tiffany M. ; Dutertre, Bruno ; Mason, Ian ; Shankar, Natarajan ; Forrest, Stephanie. / Double helix and RAVEN : A system for cyber fault tolerance and recovery. Proceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISRC 2016. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2016.
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