Abstract
When a single-object is to be traded, Bayesian and dominant-strategy incentive compatible mechanisms are interim-utility equivalent in independent, private-values environments; in the same environments, the equivalence breaks down when there are many distinct, indivisible objects to trade. We show that the fixed supply of each type of good imposes strong restrictions on the mechanisms that can be implemented. These restrictions can then be used to determine whether a given Bayesian mechanism has an equivalent dominant-strategy mechanism in a multi-unit model.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 214-226 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
Volume | 82 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 1 2019 |
Keywords
- Bayesian incentive compatibility
- Dominant strategy incentive compatibility
- Multi-dimensional mechanism design
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics