Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments

Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

When a single-object is to be traded, Bayesian and dominant-strategy incentive compatible mechanisms are interim-utility equivalent in independent, private-values environments; in the same environments, the equivalence breaks down when there are many distinct, indivisible objects to trade. We show that the fixed supply of each type of good imposes strong restrictions on the mechanisms that can be implemented. These restrictions can then be used to determine whether a given Bayesian mechanism has an equivalent dominant-strategy mechanism in a multi-unit model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)214-226
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume82
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 1 2019

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Keywords

  • Bayesian incentive compatibility
  • Dominant strategy incentive compatibility
  • Multi-dimensional mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

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