Does partnering with the World Bank shield investors from political risks in less developed countries?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study explores whether partnering with the World Bank's International Finance Corporation (IFC) protects foreign investors from aggressive actions by host countries’ governments. Building on the obsolescing bargaining model, we theorize that host states fear that hostile actions towards IFC-supported investments will damage their relationships with the World Bank. Within this context IFC support deters host government aggression towards investments. We assess our argument using country-level panel data as well as interviews with a sample of high-level managers. Findings suggest that IFC-support helps to reduce host state aggression against investing firms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number100997
JournalJournal of World Business
Volume54
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2019

Keywords

  • International Finance Corporation
  • Obsolescing bargaining model
  • Political risk
  • State-business relations
  • World Bank

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Finance
  • Marketing

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Does partnering with the World Bank shield investors from political risks in less developed countries?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this