Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper, I take it for granted both that there are two types of blameworthiness—accountability blameworthiness and attributability blameworthiness—and that avoidability is necessary only for the former. My task, then, is to explain why avoidability is necessary for accountability blameworthiness but not for attributability blameworthiness. I argue that what explains this is both the fact that these two types of blameworthiness make different sorts of reactive attitudes fitting and that only one of these two types of attitudes requires having been able to refrain from φ-ing in order for them to be fitting.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalActa Analytica
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

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Blameworthiness
Moral Responsibility
Avoidability
Accountability
Reactive Attitudes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility. / Portmore, Douglas.

In: Acta Analytica, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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