Deep rationality: The evolutionary economics of decision making

Douglas Kenrick, Vladas Griskevicius, Jill M. Sundie, Norman P. Li, Yexin Jessica Li, Steven Neuberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

61 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

What is a "rational" decision? Economists traditionally viewed rationality as maximizing expected satisfaction. This view has been useful in modeling basic microeconomic concepts, but falls short in accounting for many everyday human decisions. It leaves unanswered why some things reliably make people more satisfied than others, and why people frequently act to make others happy at a cost to themselves. Drawing on an evolutionary perspective, we propose that people make decisions according to a set of principles that may not appear to make sense at the superficial level, but that demonstrate rationality at a deeper evolutionary level. By this, we mean that people use adaptive domain-specific decision-rules that, on average, would have resulted in fitness benefits. Using this framework, we re-examine several economic principles. We suggest that traditional psychological functions governing risk aversion, discounting of future benefits, and budget allocations to multiple goods, for example, vary in predictable ways as a function of the underlying motive of the decision-maker and indi-vidual differences linked to evolved life-history strategies. A deep rationality framework not only helps explain why people make the decisions they do, but also inspires multiple directions for future research.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)764-785
Number of pages22
JournalSocial Cognition
Volume27
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2009

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Budgets
Decision Making
Economics
Psychology
Costs and Cost Analysis
Life History Traits
Direction compound

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Psychology
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology

Cite this

Deep rationality : The evolutionary economics of decision making. / Kenrick, Douglas; Griskevicius, Vladas; Sundie, Jill M.; Li, Norman P.; Li, Yexin Jessica; Neuberg, Steven.

In: Social Cognition, Vol. 27, No. 5, 10.2009, p. 764-785.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kenrick, Douglas ; Griskevicius, Vladas ; Sundie, Jill M. ; Li, Norman P. ; Li, Yexin Jessica ; Neuberg, Steven. / Deep rationality : The evolutionary economics of decision making. In: Social Cognition. 2009 ; Vol. 27, No. 5. pp. 764-785.
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