TY - JOUR
T1 - Data center demand response with on-site renewable generation
T2 - A bargaining approach
AU - Cao, Xuanyu
AU - Zhang, Junshan
AU - Poor, H. Vincent
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received May 24, 2018; revised August 27, 2018; accepted September 30, 2018; approved by IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING Editor I-H. Hou. Date of publication October 26, 2018; date of current version December 14, 2018. This work was supported in part by the Army Research Office under Grant W911NF-16-1-0448, in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant ECCS-1549881, and in part by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency under Grant HDTRA1-13-1-0029. (Corresponding author: Xuanyu Cao.) X. Cao and H. V. Poor are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA (e-mail: x.cao@princeton.edu; poor@princeton.edu).
Publisher Copyright:
© 1993-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2018/12
Y1 - 2018/12
N2 - The rapid growth of cloud computing and data centers with skyrocketing energy consumption, together with the accelerating penetration of renewable energy sources, is creating both severe challenges and tremendous opportunities. Data centers offering large flexible loads in the grid, opens up a unique opportunity to smooth out the significant fluctuation and uncertainty of renewable generation and hence enable seamless integration. To take the market power of data centers into consideration, this paper proposes a bargaining solution to the market program for data center demand response when the load serving entity (LSE) has power supply deficiency. Specifically, due to the uncertainty of load flexibility of data centers incurred by the intermittent on-site renewable generation and dynamic service requests, there exists information asymmetry between the LSE and the data center, which complicates the design of the bargaining solution. Making use of the log-concavity of the (expected) utility functions, a computationally efficient method to implement the best response updates in the bargaining procedure is presented. Furthermore, it is shown analytically that the bid sequences of the LSE and the data center are guaranteed to converge and the final price clinched by the bargaining algorithm is indeed the Nash bargaining solution, which is proportionally fair. In addition, the proposed bargaining solution is compared with two other schemes, namely the Stackelberg game and the social welfare maximization schemes. Finally, extensive numerical experiments are conducted to validate the theoretical guarantees of the bargaining and to examine the impact of various model parameters. Empirical comparison indicates the fairness advantage of the bargaining approach over the other two schemes, especially when the load of the data center is not very flexible, highlighting the importance of information feedback embodied by the bargaining procedure.
AB - The rapid growth of cloud computing and data centers with skyrocketing energy consumption, together with the accelerating penetration of renewable energy sources, is creating both severe challenges and tremendous opportunities. Data centers offering large flexible loads in the grid, opens up a unique opportunity to smooth out the significant fluctuation and uncertainty of renewable generation and hence enable seamless integration. To take the market power of data centers into consideration, this paper proposes a bargaining solution to the market program for data center demand response when the load serving entity (LSE) has power supply deficiency. Specifically, due to the uncertainty of load flexibility of data centers incurred by the intermittent on-site renewable generation and dynamic service requests, there exists information asymmetry between the LSE and the data center, which complicates the design of the bargaining solution. Making use of the log-concavity of the (expected) utility functions, a computationally efficient method to implement the best response updates in the bargaining procedure is presented. Furthermore, it is shown analytically that the bid sequences of the LSE and the data center are guaranteed to converge and the final price clinched by the bargaining algorithm is indeed the Nash bargaining solution, which is proportionally fair. In addition, the proposed bargaining solution is compared with two other schemes, namely the Stackelberg game and the social welfare maximization schemes. Finally, extensive numerical experiments are conducted to validate the theoretical guarantees of the bargaining and to examine the impact of various model parameters. Empirical comparison indicates the fairness advantage of the bargaining approach over the other two schemes, especially when the load of the data center is not very flexible, highlighting the importance of information feedback embodied by the bargaining procedure.
KW - Data center
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - bargaining
KW - demand response
KW - load serving entity
KW - renewable energy
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U2 - 10.1109/TNET.2018.2873752
DO - 10.1109/TNET.2018.2873752
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85055676406
SN - 1063-6692
VL - 26
SP - 2707
EP - 2720
JO - IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
JF - IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
IS - 6
M1 - 8511065
ER -