Abstract
An algorithm is developed to construct unobservable attacks for an AC state estimator (SE). It is shown that unobservability of the attack, in the absence of noise, is guaranteed when the attacker exploits its local network knowledge to perform AC SE locally than the simpler DC SE often assumed in the literature. Finally, the consequences of such an unobservable attack are highlighted via a scenario in which the physical system is changed due to false data injection.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting |
| Publisher | IEEE Computer Society |
| Volume | 2014-October |
| Edition | October |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 29 2014 |
| Event | 2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting - National Harbor, United States Duration: Jul 27 2014 → Jul 31 2014 |
Other
| Other | 2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | National Harbor |
| Period | 7/27/14 → 7/31/14 |
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Keywords
- consequence
- false data injection
- State estimation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Energy Engineering and Power Technology
- Nuclear Energy and Engineering
- Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Cite this
Cyber attacks on AC state estimation : Unobservability and physical consequences. / Liang, Jingwen; Kosut, Oliver; Sankar, Lalitha.
IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. Vol. 2014-October October. ed. IEEE Computer Society, 2014. 6939486.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Cyber attacks on AC state estimation
T2 - Unobservability and physical consequences
AU - Liang, Jingwen
AU - Kosut, Oliver
AU - Sankar, Lalitha
PY - 2014/10/29
Y1 - 2014/10/29
N2 - An algorithm is developed to construct unobservable attacks for an AC state estimator (SE). It is shown that unobservability of the attack, in the absence of noise, is guaranteed when the attacker exploits its local network knowledge to perform AC SE locally than the simpler DC SE often assumed in the literature. Finally, the consequences of such an unobservable attack are highlighted via a scenario in which the physical system is changed due to false data injection.
AB - An algorithm is developed to construct unobservable attacks for an AC state estimator (SE). It is shown that unobservability of the attack, in the absence of noise, is guaranteed when the attacker exploits its local network knowledge to perform AC SE locally than the simpler DC SE often assumed in the literature. Finally, the consequences of such an unobservable attack are highlighted via a scenario in which the physical system is changed due to false data injection.
KW - consequence
KW - false data injection
KW - State estimation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84930989237&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84930989237&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/PESGM.2014.6939486
DO - 10.1109/PESGM.2014.6939486
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84930989237
VL - 2014-October
BT - IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
PB - IEEE Computer Society
ER -