Cyber attacks on AC state estimation: Unobservability and physical consequences

Jingwen Liang; Oliver Kosut; Lalitha Sankar

doi:10.1109/PESGM.2014.6939486

Cyber attacks on AC state estimation: Unobservability and physical consequences

Jingwen Liang, Oliver Kosut, Lalitha Sankar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

An algorithm is developed to construct unobservable attacks for an AC state estimator (SE). It is shown that unobservability of the attack, in the absence of noise, is guaranteed when the attacker exploits its local network knowledge to perform AC SE locally than the simpler DC SE often assumed in the literature. Finally, the consequences of such an unobservable attack are highlighted via a scenario in which the physical system is changed due to false data injection.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
Volume	2014-October
Edition	October
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2014.6939486
State	Published - Oct 29 2014
Event	2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting - National Harbor, United States Duration: Jul 27 2014 → Jul 31 2014

Other

Other	2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
Country	United States
City	National Harbor
Period	7/27/14 → 7/31/14

Keywords

consequence
false data injection
State estimation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Energy Engineering and Power Technology
Nuclear Energy and Engineering
Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

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