Cyber attacks on AC state estimation: Unobservability and physical consequences

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

46 Scopus citations

Abstract

An algorithm is developed to construct unobservable attacks for an AC state estimator (SE). It is shown that unobservability of the attack, in the absence of noise, is guaranteed when the attacker exploits its local network knowledge to perform AC SE locally than the simpler DC SE often assumed in the literature. Finally, the consequences of such an unobservable attack are highlighted via a scenario in which the physical system is changed due to false data injection.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2014 IEEE PES General Meeting / Conference and Exposition
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
EditionOctober
ISBN (Electronic)9781479964154
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 29 2014
Event2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting - National Harbor, United States
Duration: Jul 27 2014Jul 31 2014

Publication series

NameIEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
NumberOctober
Volume2014-October
ISSN (Print)1944-9925
ISSN (Electronic)1944-9933

Other

Other2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNational Harbor
Period7/27/147/31/14

Keywords

  • State estimation
  • consequence
  • false data injection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Nuclear Energy and Engineering
  • Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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