Cyber attacks on AC state estimation: Unobservability and physical consequences

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An algorithm is developed to construct unobservable attacks for an AC state estimator (SE). It is shown that unobservability of the attack, in the absence of noise, is guaranteed when the attacker exploits its local network knowledge to perform AC SE locally than the simpler DC SE often assumed in the literature. Finally, the consequences of such an unobservable attack are highlighted via a scenario in which the physical system is changed due to false data injection.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Volume2014-October
EditionOctober
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 29 2014
Event2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting - National Harbor, United States
Duration: Jul 27 2014Jul 31 2014

Other

Other2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
CountryUnited States
CityNational Harbor
Period7/27/147/31/14

Fingerprint

State estimation

Keywords

  • consequence
  • false data injection
  • State estimation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Nuclear Energy and Engineering
  • Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Liang, J., Kosut, O., & Sankar, L. (2014). Cyber attacks on AC state estimation: Unobservability and physical consequences. In IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (October ed., Vol. 2014-October). [6939486] IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2014.6939486

Cyber attacks on AC state estimation : Unobservability and physical consequences. / Liang, Jingwen; Kosut, Oliver; Sankar, Lalitha.

IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. Vol. 2014-October October. ed. IEEE Computer Society, 2014. 6939486.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Liang, J, Kosut, O & Sankar, L 2014, Cyber attacks on AC state estimation: Unobservability and physical consequences. in IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. October edn, vol. 2014-October, 6939486, IEEE Computer Society, 2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, National Harbor, United States, 7/27/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2014.6939486
Liang J, Kosut O, Sankar L. Cyber attacks on AC state estimation: Unobservability and physical consequences. In IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. October ed. Vol. 2014-October. IEEE Computer Society. 2014. 6939486 https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2014.6939486
Liang, Jingwen ; Kosut, Oliver ; Sankar, Lalitha. / Cyber attacks on AC state estimation : Unobservability and physical consequences. IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. Vol. 2014-October October. ed. IEEE Computer Society, 2014.
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