Crowdsourcing to smartphones

Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing

Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue, Xi Fang, Jian Tang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

626 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Mobile phone sensing is a new paradigm which takes advantage of the pervasive smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. In a mobile phone sensing system, the platform recruits smartphone users to provide sensing service. Existing mobile phone sensing applications and systems lack good incentive mechanisms that can attract more user participation. To address this issue, we design incentive mechanisms for mobile phone sensing. We consider two system models: the platform-centric model where the platform provides a reward shared by participating users, and the user-centric model where users have more control over the payment they will receive. For the platform-centric model, we design an incentive mechanism using a Stackelberg game, where the platform is the leader while the users are the followers. We show how to compute the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium, at which the utility of the platform is maximized, and none of the users can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. For the user-centric model, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism, which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our incentive mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MOBICOM
Pages173-184
Number of pages12
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event18th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MobiCom 2012 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: Aug 22 2012Aug 26 2012

Other

Other18th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MobiCom 2012
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period8/22/128/26/12

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Smartphones
Mobile phones

Keywords

  • Crowdsourcing
  • Incentive mechanism design
  • Mobile phone sensing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Software

Cite this

Yang, D., Xue, G., Fang, X., & Tang, J. (2012). Crowdsourcing to smartphones: Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. In Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MOBICOM (pp. 173-184) https://doi.org/10.1145/2348543.2348567

Crowdsourcing to smartphones : Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. / Yang, Dejun; Xue, Guoliang; Fang, Xi; Tang, Jian.

Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MOBICOM. 2012. p. 173-184.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Yang, D, Xue, G, Fang, X & Tang, J 2012, Crowdsourcing to smartphones: Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. in Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MOBICOM. pp. 173-184, 18th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MobiCom 2012, Istanbul, Turkey, 8/22/12. https://doi.org/10.1145/2348543.2348567
Yang D, Xue G, Fang X, Tang J. Crowdsourcing to smartphones: Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. In Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MOBICOM. 2012. p. 173-184 https://doi.org/10.1145/2348543.2348567
Yang, Dejun ; Xue, Guoliang ; Fang, Xi ; Tang, Jian. / Crowdsourcing to smartphones : Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MOBICOM. 2012. pp. 173-184
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