@article{a9cfbb08a1f84fb7aa309202aa5258f0,
title = "CRISPR Patents: Aspiring to Coherent Patent Policy",
author = "Robert Cook-Deegan",
note = "Funding Information: The logic is straightforward. Give exclusive rights to a rights holder who has incentives to maximize economic return. Who else is more motivated to make sure all applications are pursued, either by using the invention or allowing others to do so? And indeed, Kitch{\textquoteright}s theory captures the social value of patents. Patents can add a layer of economic incentives atop an innovation system that is unpredictable and complex, much of it funded by government (through the National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, or foreign equivalents) and nonprofits (Wellcome Trust, Gates Foundation, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, etc.). Scientists make discoveries, but they do not ensure those translate into socially valuable goods and services. Kitch{\textquoteright}s framework does not explain much about those nonmonetary base layers of discovery, but patents do supply incentives for inducing private capital to invest in applications. And such investment depends on exclusive rights to keep others from free-riding on expensive and protracted development expenditures. So the theory goes.",
year = "2018",
month = dec,
day = "2",
doi = "10.1080/15265161.2018.1533739",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "18",
pages = "51--54",
journal = "American Journal of Bioethics",
issn = "1526-5161",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "12",
}