Costly verification in collective decisions

Albin Erlanson, Andreas Kleiner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information; the principal cannot use monetary transfers to elicit this information, but can verify an agent's claim at a cost. We characterize the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the principal. This mechanism can be implemented as a cardinal voting rule, in which agents can either cast a baseline vote, indicating only whether they are in favor of the new policy, or make specific claims about their type. The principal gives more weight to specific claims and verifies a claim whenever it is decisive.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)923-954
Number of pages32
JournalTheoretical Economics
Volume15
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2020

Keywords

  • Collective decision
  • costly verification
  • D71
  • D82

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Costly verification in collective decisions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this