Corporate vulnerability to cash tender offers

George W. Gallinger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper reports and discusses empirical results of a study which examines why some firms are attacked via unfriendly tender offers and other firms are not. The evidence indicates that target firms' managers ineffectively plan and/or implement business strategy, thus increasing their vulnerability to takeovers.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)179-196
Number of pages18
JournalStrategic Management Journal
Volume3
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1982

Fingerprint

Cash
Tender offers
Vulnerability
Business strategy
Empirical results
Managers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Corporate vulnerability to cash tender offers. / Gallinger, George W.

In: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1982, p. 179-196.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Gallinger, George W. / Corporate vulnerability to cash tender offers. In: Strategic Management Journal. 1982 ; Vol. 3, No. 3. pp. 179-196.
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