Contextualism about object-seeing

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

When is seeing part of an object enough to qualify as seeing the object itself? For instance, is seeing a cat’s tail enough to qualify as seeing the cat itself? I argue that whether a subject qualifies as seeing a given object varies with the context of the ascriber. Having made an initial case for the context-sensitivity of object-seeing, I then address the contention that it is merely a feature of the ordinary notion. I argue that the notions of object-seeing that earn their explanatory keep in both vision science and the philosophy of perception are context-sensitive as well.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2377-2396
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume173
Issue number9
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Contextualism
  • Multiple-object tracking
  • Object-seeing
  • Perceptual demonstrative thought
  • Seeing-ascriptions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Contextualism about object-seeing'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this