Abstract
When is seeing part of an object enough to qualify as seeing the object itself? For instance, is seeing a cat’s tail enough to qualify as seeing the cat itself? I argue that whether a subject qualifies as seeing a given object varies with the context of the ascriber. Having made an initial case for the context-sensitivity of object-seeing, I then address the contention that it is merely a feature of the ordinary notion. I argue that the notions of object-seeing that earn their explanatory keep in both vision science and the philosophy of perception are context-sensitive as well.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 2377-2396 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 173 |
Issue number | 9 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 1 2016 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Contextualism
- Multiple-object tracking
- Object-seeing
- Perceptual demonstrative thought
- Seeing-ascriptions
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy