Contextualism about object-seeing

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When is seeing part of an object enough to qualify as seeing the object itself? For instance, is seeing a cat’s tail enough to qualify as seeing the cat itself? I argue that whether a subject qualifies as seeing a given object varies with the context of the ascriber. Having made an initial case for the context-sensitivity of object-seeing, I then address the contention that it is merely a feature of the ordinary notion. I argue that the notions of object-seeing that earn their explanatory keep in both vision science and the philosophy of perception are context-sensitive as well.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2377-2396
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume173
Issue number9
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2016
Externally publishedYes

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Contextualism
Context Sensitivity
Philosophy

Keywords

  • Contextualism
  • Multiple-object tracking
  • Object-seeing
  • Perceptual demonstrative thought
  • Seeing-ascriptions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Contextualism about object-seeing. / Phillips, Ben.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, No. 9, 01.09.2016, p. 2377-2396.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Phillips, Ben. / Contextualism about object-seeing. In: Philosophical Studies. 2016 ; Vol. 173, No. 9. pp. 2377-2396.
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