Consequentialism and moral rationalism

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper provides a presumptive argument in favor of moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. The argument is based on the assumption that there is a conceptual connection between wrongdoing and blameworthiness. The paper argues that if we accept moral rationalism, we should reject all traditional versions of act-consequentialism (e.g., act-utilitarianism). It furthermore argues that the demandingness objection against traditional versions of act-consequentialism is best construed as a more general objection stemming from moral rationalism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Normative Ethics
PublisherOxford University Press
Volume1
ISBN (Electronic)9780191732058
ISBN (Print)9780199693269
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 19 2012

Keywords

  • Blameworthiness
  • Consequentialism
  • Demandingness objection
  • Moral rationalism
  • Utilitarianism
  • Wrongdoing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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  • Cite this

    Portmore, D. (2012). Consequentialism and moral rationalism. In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.003.0006