Abstract
In this paper, we consider a reputation system, where a number of individuals express their opinions, modeled by discrete scalars in the interval [0,1], about an object and the object's score (reputation) is determined as the arithmetic mean of all expressed opinions. An individual's expressed opinion may or may not be consistent with her actual opinion, a continuous scalar in [0,1], for a variety of reasons. In this paper, we address in a unified, game-theoretic framework the influence of two opposing social behaviors, namely conformity and manipulation, on the outcome of a reputation system. For the purposes of this paper, conformity as a social behavior refers to the tendency of an individual to express an opinion that matches the public opinion, whereas manipulation refers to the tendency of an individual to express an opinion so as to manipulate the public opinion toward her actual opinion.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Title of host publication | 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 4451-4456 |
Number of pages | 6 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781509018376 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 27 2016 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 - Las Vegas, United States Duration: Dec 12 2016 → Dec 14 2016 |
Other
Other | 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 |
---|---|
Country/Territory | United States |
City | Las Vegas |
Period | 12/12/16 → 12/14/16 |
Keywords
- actual opinion
- Conformity
- manipulation
- Nash equilibrium
- reputation system
- virtual opinion
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence
- Decision Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Control and Optimization