Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems

Seyed Rasoul Etesami, Sadegh Bolouki, Angelia Nedich, Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a reputation system, where a number of individuals express their opinions, modeled by discrete scalars in the interval [0,1], about an object and the object's score (reputation) is determined as the arithmetic mean of all expressed opinions. An individual's expressed opinion may or may not be consistent with her actual opinion, a continuous scalar in [0,1], for a variety of reasons. In this paper, we address in a unified, game-theoretic framework the influence of two opposing social behaviors, namely conformity and manipulation, on the outcome of a reputation system. For the purposes of this paper, conformity as a social behavior refers to the tendency of an individual to express an opinion that matches the public opinion, whereas manipulation refers to the tendency of an individual to express an opinion so as to manipulate the public opinion toward her actual opinion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages4451-4456
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509018376
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 27 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 - Las Vegas, United States
Duration: Dec 12 2016Dec 14 2016

Other

Other55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
CountryUnited States
CityLas Vegas
Period12/12/1612/14/16

Fingerprint

Reputation System
Manipulation
Social Behavior
Express
Scalar
Game
Interval
Conformity
Public opinion
Reputation system
Object

Keywords

  • actual opinion
  • Conformity
  • manipulation
  • Nash equilibrium
  • reputation system
  • virtual opinion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Decision Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Etesami, S. R., Bolouki, S., Nedich, A., & Basar, T. (2016). Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems. In 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 (pp. 4451-4456). [7798945] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7798945

Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems. / Etesami, Seyed Rasoul; Bolouki, Sadegh; Nedich, Angelia; Basar, Tamer.

2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 4451-4456 7798945.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Etesami, SR, Bolouki, S, Nedich, A & Basar, T 2016, Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems. in 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016., 7798945, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 4451-4456, 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016, Las Vegas, United States, 12/12/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7798945
Etesami SR, Bolouki S, Nedich A, Basar T. Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems. In 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. p. 4451-4456. 7798945 https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7798945
Etesami, Seyed Rasoul ; Bolouki, Sadegh ; Nedich, Angelia ; Basar, Tamer. / Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems. 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. pp. 4451-4456
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