Conflict Between Controlling Family Owners and Minority Shareholders: Much Ado About Nothing?

Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Pascual Berrone, Marianna Makri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

21 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine the unique nature of conflict between controlling family owners and minority shareholders (principal-principal conflict) in publicly traded family controlled firms through examining shareholder proposals. Implicit in prior governance and family business research has been that nonfamily shareholders are likely to be in conflict with the dominant family owners. In general, we find that much of this fear may be unwarranted except under specific circumstances. Our findings elucidate sources of heterogeneity in family firm principal-principal conflict and add greater nuance to our understanding of this type of agency problem within family firms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalEntrepreneurship: Theory and Practice
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Business and International Management

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