Abstract

Bargaining power in vertical channels depends critically on the ‘disagreement profit’ or the opportunity cost to each player should negotiations fail. In a multiproduct context, disagreement profit depends on the degree of substitutability among the products offered by the downstream retailer. We develop an empirical framework that is able to estimate the effect of retail complementarity on bargaining power, and margins earned by manufacturers and retailers in the French soft-drink industry. We show that complementarity increases the strength of retailers’ bargaining position, so their share of the total margin increases by almost 28 per cent relative to the no-complementarity case.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)297-331
Number of pages35
JournalEuropean Review of Agricultural Economics
Volume45
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2018

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profits and margins
Carbonated Beverages
opportunity costs
soft drinks
Negotiating
Industry
industry
Costs and Cost Analysis
Power (Psychology)
Complementarity
Bargaining power
Retailers
Margin
Profit
Retail
Substitutability
Opportunity cost
Soft drinks

Keywords

  • Bargaining power
  • Complementary goods
  • Nash-in-Nash equilibrium
  • Retailing
  • Soft drinks
  • Vertical relationships

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Complementarity and bargaining power. / Richards, Timothy; Bonnet, Celine; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra.

In: European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 45, No. 3, 01.07.2018, p. 297-331.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Richards, Timothy ; Bonnet, Celine ; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra. / Complementarity and bargaining power. In: European Review of Agricultural Economics. 2018 ; Vol. 45, No. 3. pp. 297-331.
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