Compact and Malicious Private Set Intersection for Small Sets

Mike Rosulek, Ni Trieu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We describe a protocol for two-party private set intersection (PSI) based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The protocol is proven secure against malicious parties, in the ideal permutation + random oracle model. For small sets (500 items or fewer), our protocol requires the least time and communication of any known PSI protocol, even ones that are only semi-honest secure and ones that are not based on Diffie-Hellman. It is one of the few significant improvements to the 20-year old classical Diffie-Hellman PSI protocol of Huberman, Franklin, and Hogg (ACM Elec. Commerce 1999). Our protocol is actually a generic transformation that constructs PSI from a class of key agreement protocols. This transformation is inspired by a technique of Cho, Dachman-Soled, and Jarecki (CT-RSA 2016), which we streamline and optimize in several important ways to achieve our superior efficiency.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages1166-1181
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)9781450384544
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 12 2021
Event27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021 - Virtual, Online, Korea, Republic of
Duration: Nov 15 2021Nov 19 2021

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)1543-7221

Conference

Conference27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CityVirtual, Online
Period11/15/2111/19/21

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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