TY - JOUR
T1 - Coalitions in cooperative wireless networks
AU - Mathur, Suhas
AU - Sankar, Lalitha
AU - Mandayam, Narayan B.
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received August 15, 2007; revised January 28, 2008. The work of S. Mathur, L. Sankar (previously Sankaranarayanan) and N. B. Man-dayam was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. TF:0634973. The material in this paper was presented in part at the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, Seattle, WA, Jul. 2006; at the IEEE Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, Princeton, NJ, Mar. 2006; at the 40th Annual Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, Pacific Grove, CA, Nov. 2006; and at the Information Theory and Applications Workshop, San Diego, CA, Jan. 2008.
PY - 2008/9
Y1 - 2008/9
N2 - Cooperation between rational users in wireless networks is studied using coalitional game theory. Using the rate achieved by a user as its utility, it is shown that the stable coalition structure, i.e., set of coalitions from which users have no incentives to defect, depends on the manner in which the rate gains are apportioned among the cooperating users. Specifically, the stability of the grand coalition (GC), i.e., the coalition of all users, is studied. Transmitter and receiver cooperation in an interference channel (IC) are studied as illustrative cooperative models to determine the stable coalitions for both flexible (transferable) and fixed (non-transferable) apportioning schemes. It is shown that the stable sum-rate optimal coalition when only receivers cooperate by jointly decoding (transferable) is the GC. The stability of the GC depends on the detector when receivers cooperate using linear multiuser detectors (non-transferable). Transmitter cooperation is studied assuming that all receivers cooperate perfectly and that users outside a coalition act as jammers. The stability of the GC is studied for both the case of perfectly cooperating transmitters (transferable) and under a partial decode-and-forward strategy (non-transferable). In both cases, the stability is shown to depend on the channel gains and the transmitter jamming strengths.
AB - Cooperation between rational users in wireless networks is studied using coalitional game theory. Using the rate achieved by a user as its utility, it is shown that the stable coalition structure, i.e., set of coalitions from which users have no incentives to defect, depends on the manner in which the rate gains are apportioned among the cooperating users. Specifically, the stability of the grand coalition (GC), i.e., the coalition of all users, is studied. Transmitter and receiver cooperation in an interference channel (IC) are studied as illustrative cooperative models to determine the stable coalitions for both flexible (transferable) and fixed (non-transferable) apportioning schemes. It is shown that the stable sum-rate optimal coalition when only receivers cooperate by jointly decoding (transferable) is the GC. The stability of the GC depends on the detector when receivers cooperate using linear multiuser detectors (non-transferable). Transmitter cooperation is studied assuming that all receivers cooperate perfectly and that users outside a coalition act as jammers. The stability of the GC is studied for both the case of perfectly cooperating transmitters (transferable) and under a partial decode-and-forward strategy (non-transferable). In both cases, the stability is shown to depend on the channel gains and the transmitter jamming strengths.
KW - Coalitional games
KW - Cooperative communications
KW - Interference channel
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U2 - 10.1109/JSAC.2008.080908
DO - 10.1109/JSAC.2008.080908
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:50649095176
SN - 0733-8716
VL - 26
SP - 1104
EP - 1115
JO - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
JF - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IS - 7
M1 - 4604736
ER -