Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: Matching alliance governance to asset type

Glenn Hoetker, Thomas Mellewigt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

236 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Formal and relational governance mechanisms are used in strategic alliances to coordinate resources and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. While recent work has shown thathese approaches are not mutually exclusive, we understand little about when one approach is superior to the other. Using data on the governance choices and subsequent performance of alliances in the German telecommunications industry, we find that the optimal configuration of formal and relational governance mechanisms depends on the assets involved in an alliance, with formal mechanisms best suited to property-based assets and relational governance best suited to knowledge-based assets. Furthermore, a mismatch between governance mechanisms and asset type can harm the performance of the alliance. Our findings contribute to transaction cost economics, the literature on relational governance, and recent work studying their interaction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1025-1044
Number of pages20
JournalStrategic Management Journal
Volume30
Issue number10
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2009
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Alliances
Governance mechanisms
Governance
Relational governance
Assets
Opportunistic behavior
Knowledge-based
Mismatch
Telecommunications industry
Strategic alliances
Resources
Transaction cost economics
Interaction

Keywords

  • Alliances
  • Formal governance
  • Relational governance
  • Telecommunications industry

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Choice and performance of governance mechanisms : Matching alliance governance to asset type. / Hoetker, Glenn; Mellewigt, Thomas.

In: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 30, No. 10, 10.2009, p. 1025-1044.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Hoetker, Glenn ; Mellewigt, Thomas. / Choice and performance of governance mechanisms : Matching alliance governance to asset type. In: Strategic Management Journal. 2009 ; Vol. 30, No. 10. pp. 1025-1044.
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