Abstract
Intent-based communication is an inter-application communication mechanism in Android. While its importance has been proven by plenty of security extensions that protect it with policy-driven mandatory access control, an overlooked problem is the verification of the security policies. Checking one security extension's policy is indeed complex. Furthermore, intent-based communication introduces even more complexities because it is mediated by multiple security extensions that respectively enforce their own incompatible, distributed, and dynamic policies. This paper seeks a systematic approach to address the complexities involved in checking intent-based communication. To this end, we propose intent space analysis. Intent space analysis formulates the intent forwarding functionalities of security extensions as transformations on a geometric intent space. We further introduce a policy checking framework called IntentScope that proactively and automatically aggregates distributed policies into a holistic and verifiable view. We evaluate our approach against customized Android OSs and commodity Android devices. In addition, we further conduct experiments with four security extensions to demonstrate how our approach helps identify potential vulnerabilities in each extension.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | ASIA CCS 2016 - Proceedings of the 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
| Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery, Inc |
| Pages | 735-746 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450342339 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 30 2016 |
| Event | 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2016 - Xi'an, China Duration: May 30 2016 → Jun 3 2016 |
Other
| Other | 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2016 |
|---|---|
| Country | China |
| City | Xi'an |
| Period | 5/30/16 → 6/3/16 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science Applications
- Software
- Computer Networks and Communications
Cite this
Checking intent-based communication in android with intent space analysis. / Jing, Yiming; Ahn, Gail-Joon; Doupe, Adam; Yi, Jeong Hyun.
ASIA CCS 2016 - Proceedings of the 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2016. p. 735-746.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
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TY - GEN
T1 - Checking intent-based communication in android with intent space analysis
AU - Jing, Yiming
AU - Ahn, Gail-Joon
AU - Doupe, Adam
AU - Yi, Jeong Hyun
PY - 2016/5/30
Y1 - 2016/5/30
N2 - Intent-based communication is an inter-application communication mechanism in Android. While its importance has been proven by plenty of security extensions that protect it with policy-driven mandatory access control, an overlooked problem is the verification of the security policies. Checking one security extension's policy is indeed complex. Furthermore, intent-based communication introduces even more complexities because it is mediated by multiple security extensions that respectively enforce their own incompatible, distributed, and dynamic policies. This paper seeks a systematic approach to address the complexities involved in checking intent-based communication. To this end, we propose intent space analysis. Intent space analysis formulates the intent forwarding functionalities of security extensions as transformations on a geometric intent space. We further introduce a policy checking framework called IntentScope that proactively and automatically aggregates distributed policies into a holistic and verifiable view. We evaluate our approach against customized Android OSs and commodity Android devices. In addition, we further conduct experiments with four security extensions to demonstrate how our approach helps identify potential vulnerabilities in each extension.
AB - Intent-based communication is an inter-application communication mechanism in Android. While its importance has been proven by plenty of security extensions that protect it with policy-driven mandatory access control, an overlooked problem is the verification of the security policies. Checking one security extension's policy is indeed complex. Furthermore, intent-based communication introduces even more complexities because it is mediated by multiple security extensions that respectively enforce their own incompatible, distributed, and dynamic policies. This paper seeks a systematic approach to address the complexities involved in checking intent-based communication. To this end, we propose intent space analysis. Intent space analysis formulates the intent forwarding functionalities of security extensions as transformations on a geometric intent space. We further introduce a policy checking framework called IntentScope that proactively and automatically aggregates distributed policies into a holistic and verifiable view. We evaluate our approach against customized Android OSs and commodity Android devices. In addition, we further conduct experiments with four security extensions to demonstrate how our approach helps identify potential vulnerabilities in each extension.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84979680901&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84979680901&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2897845.2897904
DO - 10.1145/2897845.2897904
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84979680901
SP - 735
EP - 746
BT - ASIA CCS 2016 - Proceedings of the 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
ER -