Cheating when in the hole: The case of New York city taxis

Shivaram Rajgopal, Roger White

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We examine the influence of rationalization on NYC taxi drivers’ decisions to cheat their customers. We find that cheating ramps up by an order of magnitude when taxi drivers are in settings where it is easier for them to view cheating as acceptable as opposed to dishonest. This finding provides field evidence support for the idea that self-concept maintenance plays an important role in preventing fraud, and that fraud in economic exchange multiplies when participants can rationalize cheating in a way that precludes it from affecting their self-concept.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number101070
JournalAccounting, Organizations and Society
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Information Systems and Management

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