TY - JOUR
T1 - Cheap talk when interests conflict
AU - Silk, Joan B.
AU - Kaldor, Elizabeth
AU - Boyd, Robert
N1 - Funding Information:
This study was conducted at the Caribbean Primate Research Center and E.K. acknowledges the assistance of Matt Kessler and John Berard. E.K.’s field research was partially supported with funds from the Department of Anthropology at UCLA. We thank Joseph Manson, Francisco Gil-White, and members of the Biological Anthropology Colloquium for helpful comments on this project. The research presented in this report was described in proposal No. PC 950316, which was approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of the University of Puerto Rico, Medical Sciences Campus on 31 March 1995.
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - Most evolutionary analyses of animal communication suggest that low-cost signals can evolve only when both the signaller and the recipient rank outcomes in the same order. When there is a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, honest signals must be costly. However, recent work suggests that low-cost signals can be evolutionarily stable, even when the sender and the receiver rank outcomes in different orders, as long as the interest in achieving coordination is sufficiently great. In this paper, we extend this body of work by analysing a game theory model that shows that low-cost signals can evolve when there are conflicts of interest and no interest in coordination, as long as individuals interact repeatedly. We also present an empirical example indicating that female rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, use honest, low-cost, vocal signals to facilitate interactions when conflicts of interest exist. (C) 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
AB - Most evolutionary analyses of animal communication suggest that low-cost signals can evolve only when both the signaller and the recipient rank outcomes in the same order. When there is a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, honest signals must be costly. However, recent work suggests that low-cost signals can be evolutionarily stable, even when the sender and the receiver rank outcomes in different orders, as long as the interest in achieving coordination is sufficiently great. In this paper, we extend this body of work by analysing a game theory model that shows that low-cost signals can evolve when there are conflicts of interest and no interest in coordination, as long as individuals interact repeatedly. We also present an empirical example indicating that female rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, use honest, low-cost, vocal signals to facilitate interactions when conflicts of interest exist. (C) 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
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U2 - 10.1006/anbe.1999.1312
DO - 10.1006/anbe.1999.1312
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0033837713
SN - 0003-3472
VL - 59
SP - 423
EP - 432
JO - Animal Behaviour
JF - Animal Behaviour
IS - 2
ER -