CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

Sabrina Chi, Xiaochuan Huang, Juan Manuel Sanchez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk-appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash-out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt-like compensation for corporate tax policies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalJournal of Accounting Research
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2017

Fingerprint

Debt
Incentives
Corporate tax
Chief executive officer
Pensions
Tax
Tax shelters
Liquidity
Default risk
Risk appetite
Prediction
Cash flow volatility
Threat
Liability
Cash
Tax policy

Keywords

  • Deferred compensation
  • Executive compensation
  • Incentives
  • Inside debt
  • Tax sheltering
  • Tax shelters

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering. / Chi, Sabrina; Huang, Xiaochuan; Sanchez, Juan Manuel.

In: Journal of Accounting Research, 2017.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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