Career tournaments

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies a model of career concerns where (besides agents having different ability levels) principals are heterogeneous. Two types of heterogeneity are considered: principals can differ in their productivities, and in the visibility of the agents working for them. Productivity differences result in convex wage profiles and generate assortative matching between principals and agents. Visibility differences, on the other hand, affect the mobility and career prospects of agents, and can generate nonassortative matching. We characterize the equilibrium in this market, derive implications for the behavior of agents, and examine the incentives to invest in increasing productivity and visibility.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)667-698
Number of pages32
JournalJournal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume19
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2010
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Visibility
Productivity
Wages
Tournament
Wage profile
Assortative matching
Career concerns
Incentives

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Career tournaments. / Casas Arce, Pablo.

In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 19, No. 3, 09.2010, p. 667-698.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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