Can predictive filters detect gradually ramping false data injection attacks against PMUs?

Zhigang Chu, Andrea Pinceti, Reetam Sen Biswas, Oliver Kosut, Anamitra Pal, Lalitha Sankar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Intelligently designed false data injection (FDI) attacks have been shown to be able to bypass the χ2-test based bad data detector (BDD), resulting in physical consequences (such as line overloads) in the power system. In this paper, using synthetic PMU measurements and intelligently designed FDI attacks, it is shown that if an attack is suddenly injected into the system, a predictive filter with sufficient accuracy is able to detect it. However, an attacker can gradually increase the magnitude of the attack to avoid detection, and still cause damage to the system.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781538680995
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2019
Event2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019 - Beijing, China
Duration: Oct 21 2019Oct 23 2019

Publication series

Name2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019

Conference

Conference2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019
CountryChina
CityBeijing
Period10/21/1910/23/19

Fingerprint

Injection
Attack
Filter
Detectors
Overload
damages
Power System
cause
Damage
Detector
Sufficient
False
Line

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Control and Optimization
  • Transportation

Cite this

Chu, Z., Pinceti, A., Biswas, R. S., Kosut, O., Pal, A., & Sankar, L. (2019). Can predictive filters detect gradually ramping false data injection attacks against PMUs? In 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019 [8909739] (2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2019.8909739

Can predictive filters detect gradually ramping false data injection attacks against PMUs? / Chu, Zhigang; Pinceti, Andrea; Biswas, Reetam Sen; Kosut, Oliver; Pal, Anamitra; Sankar, Lalitha.

2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. 8909739 (2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Chu, Z, Pinceti, A, Biswas, RS, Kosut, O, Pal, A & Sankar, L 2019, Can predictive filters detect gradually ramping false data injection attacks against PMUs? in 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019., 8909739, 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019, Beijing, China, 10/21/19. https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2019.8909739
Chu Z, Pinceti A, Biswas RS, Kosut O, Pal A, Sankar L. Can predictive filters detect gradually ramping false data injection attacks against PMUs? In 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. 8909739. (2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019). https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2019.8909739
Chu, Zhigang ; Pinceti, Andrea ; Biswas, Reetam Sen ; Kosut, Oliver ; Pal, Anamitra ; Sankar, Lalitha. / Can predictive filters detect gradually ramping false data injection attacks against PMUs?. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. (2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019).
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