Burge's Dualism 1

Bernard W. Kobes

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Dualist themes in Burge's philosophy of mind are gathered and articulated. Burge's antiindividualism yields an argument against token-identity theory; his reflections on mental causation have a dualist flavor; and he doubts that the relation of mental events to neural events is one of composition or constitution. This chapter argues that compositional materialism about representational mental events would be false just in case a 'mathematical archangel', starting from a base of fundamental material facts, could not discern as causally salient the neural event underlying a representational event prior to identifying the representational mental event as such and its causal relations. Burge's doubts about neural composition of the mental could thus be empirically confirmed.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Waning of Materialism
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191721014
ISBN (Print)9780199556182
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2010

Keywords

  • Anti-individualism
  • Burge
  • Mental causation
  • Neural composition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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  • Cite this

    Kobes, B. W. (2010). Burge's Dualism 1. In The Waning of Materialism Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0010