Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives

Amy J. Hillman, Thomas Dalziel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1335 Scopus citations

Abstract

Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and providing resources. Agency theorists assert that effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives, whereas resource dependence theorists contend that the provision of resources is a function of board capital. We combine the two perspectives and argue that board capital affects both board monitoring and the provision of resources and that board incentives moderate these relationships.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)383-396
Number of pages14
JournalAcademy of Management Review
Volume28
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2003
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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