Abstract
This study develops a combined agency–resource dependence perspective and applies it to the study of interlocking directorates. It suggests that interlocking directorates may exert either a positive or a negative effect on subsequent firm performance, depending on the firm’s relative resources, power imbalance, ownership concentration, and CEO ownership. A test on a sample of 145 Italian companies provides support for hypothesized effects. This study suggests that integrating agency and resource dependence theories provides a higher-order explanation of firm performance and helps advance both agency and resource dependence theories.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 589-618 |
Number of pages | 30 |
Journal | Journal of Management |
Volume | 44 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 1 2018 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- agency theory
- boards of directors
- resource dependence
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Strategy and Management