Board Interlocks and Firm Performance: Toward a Combined Agency–Resource Dependence Perspective

Fabio Zona, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Michael C. Withers

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

45 Scopus citations


This study develops a combined agency–resource dependence perspective and applies it to the study of interlocking directorates. It suggests that interlocking directorates may exert either a positive or a negative effect on subsequent firm performance, depending on the firm’s relative resources, power imbalance, ownership concentration, and CEO ownership. A test on a sample of 145 Italian companies provides support for hypothesized effects. This study suggests that integrating agency and resource dependence theories provides a higher-order explanation of firm performance and helps advance both agency and resource dependence theories.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)589-618
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Management
Issue number2
StatePublished - Feb 1 2018
Externally publishedYes



  • agency theory
  • boards of directors
  • resource dependence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Strategy and Management

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