Blockholder Heterogeneity, CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance

Christopher P. Clifford, Laura Lindsey

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines heterogeneity in blockholder monitoring across investor types. We document which blockholder types (e.g., mutual funds, hedge funds) are more likely to be associated with active monitoring and show that firms targeted by such blockholders are more likely to increase the equity portion of chief executive officer (CEO) pay. Further, using market-wide and exogenous shocks to liquidity to identify differences in efficacy across blockholder types, we observe greater operating-performance improvements in actively monitored firms when passive monitoring is less effective, suggesting causal impact. We propose differences in compensation arrangements across blockholder types as a mechanism underlying blockholders' heterogeneous role.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1491-1520
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume51
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Blockholder Heterogeneity, CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this