Between Mendez and Brown: Gonzales v. Sheely (1951) and the legal Campaign against segregation

Jeanne Powers, Lirio Patton

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

On March 26, 1951, three years before the historic Brown decision, in Gonzales v. Sheeley (1951), Judge Dave Ling of the United States District Court of Arizona ruled that the segregation of Mexican American students in a separate "Mexican School" was unconstitutional. In this article, we trace the legal arguments in Gonzales through two prior cases, Mendez v. Westminster (1946) and Delgado v. Bastrop (1948). We analyze how racialism, the social science critique of racism and legalism, shaped the arguments in the three cases. Our analysis suggests that Gonzales was a departure from Mendez and Delgado because it was the first case in which a court made an unqualified argument against segregation. The trajectory of the legal arguments across the three cases highlights how new cultural ideas about race were slowly incorporated into civil rights case law, a process that was also shaped by the institutional norms and practices of the legal system.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)127-171
Number of pages45
JournalLaw and Social Inquiry
Volume33
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2008

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segregation
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legalism
district court
civil rights
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legal system
racism
social science
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Between Mendez and Brown : Gonzales v. Sheely (1951) and the legal Campaign against segregation. / Powers, Jeanne; Patton, Lirio.

In: Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 33, No. 1, 03.2008, p. 127-171.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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