Belief Updating in Moral Dilemmas

Zachary Horne, Derek Powell, Joseph Spino

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Moral psychologists have shown that people's past moral experiences can affect their subsequent moral decisions. One prominent finding in this line of research is that when people make a judgment about the Trolley dilemma after considering the Footbridge dilemma, they are significantly less likely to decide it is acceptable to redirect a train to save five people. Additionally, this ordering effect is asymmetrical, as making a judgment about the Trolley dilemma has little to no effect on people's judgments about the Footbridge dilemma. We argue that this asymmetry is the result of a difference in how each dilemma affects people's beliefs about the importance of saving lives. In two experiments, we show that considering the Footbridge dilemma disconfirms these beliefs, while considering the Trolley dilemma does not significantly affect them. Consistent with predictions of sequential learning models, our findings offer a clear and parsimonious account of the asymmetry in the ordering effect.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)705-714
Number of pages10
JournalReview of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume4
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2013
Externally publishedYes

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Learning
Psychology
Research
Belief Updating
Moral Dilemmas
Asymmetry
Prediction
Asymmetrical
Learning Model
Psychologists
Train
Experiment
Moral Experience

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Philosophy

Cite this

Belief Updating in Moral Dilemmas. / Horne, Zachary; Powell, Derek; Spino, Joseph.

In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 4, 01.12.2013, p. 705-714.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Horne, Zachary ; Powell, Derek ; Spino, Joseph. / Belief Updating in Moral Dilemmas. In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 2013 ; Vol. 4, No. 4. pp. 705-714.
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