Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model

Alejandro Manelli; Daniel R. Vincent

doi:10.3982/ECTA8025

Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model

Alejandro Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

54 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove-in the standard independent private-values model-that the outcome, in terms of interim expected probabilities of trade and interim expected transfers, of any Bayesian mechanism can also be obtained with a dominant-strategy mechanism.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1905-1938
Number of pages	34
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	78
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8025
State	Published - Nov 2010

Keywords

Adverse selection
Auctions
Bayesian implementations
Bilateral trade
Dominant-strategy implementation
Incentive compatibility
Independent private values
Mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.3982/ECTA8025

Cite this

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title = "Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model",

abstract = "We prove-in the standard independent private-values model-that the outcome, in terms of interim expected probabilities of trade and interim expected transfers, of any Bayesian mechanism can also be obtained with a dominant-strategy mechanism.",

keywords = "Adverse selection, Auctions, Bayesian implementations, Bilateral trade, Dominant-strategy implementation, Incentive compatibility, Independent private values, Mechanism design",

author = "Alejandro Manelli and Vincent, {Daniel R.}",

year = "2010",

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AU - Manelli, Alejandro

AU - Vincent, Daniel R.

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AB - We prove-in the standard independent private-values model-that the outcome, in terms of interim expected probabilities of trade and interim expected transfers, of any Bayesian mechanism can also be obtained with a dominant-strategy mechanism.

KW - Adverse selection

KW - Auctions

KW - Bayesian implementations

KW - Bilateral trade

KW - Dominant-strategy implementation

KW - Incentive compatibility

KW - Independent private values

KW - Mechanism design

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JO - Econometrica

JF - Econometrica

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ER -

Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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