Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model

Alejandro Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

39 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove-in the standard independent private-values model-that the outcome, in terms of interim expected probabilities of trade and interim expected transfers, of any Bayesian mechanism can also be obtained with a dominant-strategy mechanism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1905-1938
Number of pages34
JournalEconometrica
Volume78
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2010

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Keywords

  • Adverse selection
  • Auctions
  • Bayesian implementations
  • Bilateral trade
  • Dominant-strategy implementation
  • Incentive compatibility
  • Independent private values
  • Mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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