Bargaining theory and cooperative fishing participation on Ifaluk Atoll

Richard Sosis, Sharon Feldstein, Kim Hill

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we examine the merit of bargaining theory, in its economic and ecological forms, as a model for understanding variation in the frequency of participation in cooperative fishing among men of Ifaluk atoll in Micronesia. Two determinants of bargaining power are considered: resource control and a bargainer's utility gain for his expected share of the negotiated resource. Several hypotheses which relate cultural and life-course parameters to bargaining power are tested against data on the frequency of cooperative sail-fishing participation. Consistent with predictions generated from bargaining theory, we show that (1) age is negatively correlated with cooperative fishing participation, (2) men of high-ranking clans and men with high levels of education fish less than men of low-ranking clans and less-educated men, (3) men with high expected utility gains from fishing returns fish more than men with low expected utility gains, (4) number of dependents is positively correlated with cooperative fishing participation, and (5) the number of young genetic offspring residing with a man is positively correlated with cooperative fishing participation, whereas the number of genetic offspring more than 13 years old who are residing with a man is negatively correlated with cooperative fishing participation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)163-203
Number of pages41
JournalHuman Nature
Volume9
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1998
Externally publishedYes

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bargaining
atoll
cooperatives
fishing
participation
bargaining power
ranking
Micronesia
economic theory
ice ridge
educational status
resource
fish
Participation
Fishing
level of education
resources
prediction
determinants
economics

Keywords

  • Bargaining theory
  • Collective action
  • Cooperative fishing
  • Micronesia

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Anthropology

Cite this

Bargaining theory and cooperative fishing participation on Ifaluk Atoll. / Sosis, Richard; Feldstein, Sharon; Hill, Kim.

In: Human Nature, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1998, p. 163-203.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Sosis, R, Feldstein, S & Hill, K 1998, 'Bargaining theory and cooperative fishing participation on Ifaluk Atoll', Human Nature, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 163-203.
Sosis, Richard ; Feldstein, Sharon ; Hill, Kim. / Bargaining theory and cooperative fishing participation on Ifaluk Atoll. In: Human Nature. 1998 ; Vol. 9, No. 2. pp. 163-203.
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