Authentication capacity of adversarial channels

Oliver Kosut, Jörg Kliewer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Keyless authentication is considered in an adversarial point-to-point channel. Namely, a legitimate transmitter and receiver aim to communicate over a noisy channel that may or may not also contain an active adversary, capable of transmitting an arbitrary signal into the channel. If the adversary is not present, then the receiver must successfully decode the message with high probability; if it is present, then the receiver must either decode the message or detect the adversary's presence. Thus, whenever the receiver decodes, it can be certain that the decoded message is authentic. The exact authentication capacity is characterized for discrete-memoryless adversary channels, where the adversary is assumed to know the code but not the message. The authentication capacity is shown to be either zero or equal to the no-adversary capacity, depending on whether the channel satisfies a condition termed overwritability.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781538635995
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 15 2019
Event2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018 - Guangzhou, China
Duration: Nov 25 2018Nov 29 2018

Publication series

Name2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018

Conference

Conference2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018
CountryChina
CityGuangzhou
Period11/25/1811/29/18

Fingerprint

Authentication
Transmitters

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Information Systems

Cite this

Kosut, O., & Kliewer, J. (2019). Authentication capacity of adversarial channels. In 2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018 [8613353] (2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ITW.2018.8613353

Authentication capacity of adversarial channels. / Kosut, Oliver; Kliewer, Jörg.

2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. 8613353 (2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Kosut, O & Kliewer, J 2019, Authentication capacity of adversarial channels. in 2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018., 8613353, 2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018, Guangzhou, China, 11/25/18. https://doi.org/10.1109/ITW.2018.8613353
Kosut O, Kliewer J. Authentication capacity of adversarial channels. In 2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. 8613353. (2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018). https://doi.org/10.1109/ITW.2018.8613353
Kosut, Oliver ; Kliewer, Jörg. / Authentication capacity of adversarial channels. 2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. (2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2018).
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