Authentication Against a Myopic Adversary

Allison Beemer, Oliver Kosut, Joerg Kliewer, Eric Graves, Paul Yu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider keyless authentication for point-To-point communication in the presence of a myopic adversary. In particular, the adversary has access to a non-causal noisy version of the transmission and may use this knowledge to choose a channel state; the receiver is successful if it either decodes to the correct message or correctly detects adversarial interference. We show that, depending on the relationship between the channels to the legitimate receiver and the adversary, the authentication capacity is either zero or bounded above by the no-Adversary capacity. To this end we introduce a novel channel property, termed U-overwritability, which allows the adversary to make its false message appear legitimate. We conjecture that if the capacity is nonzero, it is in fact equal to the no-Adversary capacity, and show that this is true for a particular binary model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781538671177
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2019
Event2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019 - Washington, United States
Duration: Jun 10 2019Jun 12 2019

Publication series

Name2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019

Conference

Conference2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019
CountryUnited States
CityWashington
Period6/10/196/12/19

Fingerprint

Authentication
Communication

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Information Systems and Management
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Cite this

Beemer, A., Kosut, O., Kliewer, J., Graves, E., & Yu, P. (2019). Authentication Against a Myopic Adversary. In 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019 [8802705] (2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2019.8802705

Authentication Against a Myopic Adversary. / Beemer, Allison; Kosut, Oliver; Kliewer, Joerg; Graves, Eric; Yu, Paul.

2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. 8802705 (2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Beemer, A, Kosut, O, Kliewer, J, Graves, E & Yu, P 2019, Authentication Against a Myopic Adversary. in 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019., 8802705, 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019, Washington, United States, 6/10/19. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2019.8802705
Beemer A, Kosut O, Kliewer J, Graves E, Yu P. Authentication Against a Myopic Adversary. In 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. 8802705. (2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019). https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2019.8802705
Beemer, Allison ; Kosut, Oliver ; Kliewer, Joerg ; Graves, Eric ; Yu, Paul. / Authentication Against a Myopic Adversary. 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. (2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2019).
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