Architects of stability? International cooperation among financial supervisors

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Speaking in May 1998, in the shadow of an Asian financial crisis that was spreading globally, International Monetary Fund Managing Director Michel Camdessus announced that “the leaders of the world want to embark on the design of a new (financial) architecture.” Reflecting the position that industrial world governments would formally adopt at their forthcoming G8 summit in England, he asserted that the new architecture must be built atop several cornerstones, including a commitment to financial sector openness, good governance, and greater economic transparency. In addition, he suggested that international financial markets required the continuing elaboration of multilateral standards, codes, and best practices if future crises were to be avoided (Camdessus 1998). It did not take long for skeptics of this G8 proposal to rear their heads; after all, grandiose phrases like “new financial architecture” naturally provoked them. In a speech before the World Affairs Council, for example, Berkeley professor and former US Treasury official J. Bradford DeLong stated that “there is no world-wide political consensus” with respect to the systemic risks facing the global economy and that, as a consequence, “dreams of a rebuilt, reformed, and renewed international financial architecture will remain nothing but dreams” (DeLong 1999). Beyond these skeptics lurked the critics who – whether coming from the left or the right of the political spectrum – curiously shared the conspiratorial view that the new international financial architecture represented nothing more than another underhanded attempt by governments and international organizations to bail out reckless banks at taxpayer expense.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Past and Future of Central Bank Cooperation
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages113-152
Number of pages40
Volume9780521877794
ISBN (Print)9780511510779, 9780521877794
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2008
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Financial architecture
Government
International cooperation
International financial architecture
Supervisors
International organizations
Financial sector
Best practice
Openness
Elaboration
Transparency
Systemic risk
Economics
Asian financial crisis
Bailout
Global economy
International Monetary Fund
England
International financial markets
Expenses

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Kapstein, E. (2008). Architects of stability? International cooperation among financial supervisors. In The Past and Future of Central Bank Cooperation (Vol. 9780521877794, pp. 113-152). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510779.004

Architects of stability? International cooperation among financial supervisors. / Kapstein, Ethan.

The Past and Future of Central Bank Cooperation. Vol. 9780521877794 Cambridge University Press, 2008. p. 113-152.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Kapstein, E 2008, Architects of stability? International cooperation among financial supervisors. in The Past and Future of Central Bank Cooperation. vol. 9780521877794, Cambridge University Press, pp. 113-152. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510779.004
Kapstein E. Architects of stability? International cooperation among financial supervisors. In The Past and Future of Central Bank Cooperation. Vol. 9780521877794. Cambridge University Press. 2008. p. 113-152 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510779.004
Kapstein, Ethan. / Architects of stability? International cooperation among financial supervisors. The Past and Future of Central Bank Cooperation. Vol. 9780521877794 Cambridge University Press, 2008. pp. 113-152
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