An Overview of American Free Speech Doctrine and its Application to Extreme Speech

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    13 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This chapter describes the basic features of the American free speech doctrine and then considers its application to various forms of extreme speech. This analysis reveals that most of the speech restrictions considered in this book, while consistent with the constitutional norms of other democracies, would be unconstitutional in the U.S. The leitmotif of contemporary American free speech doctrine is its intense hostility to content regulation of public discourse, particularly viewpoint regulation. In addition, Brandenburg v. Ohio narrowly confines governmental power to punish the advocacy of law violation. Hate speech bans, whether in the form of public order regulations, prohibitions against group defamation, or bans on Holocaust denial, would be deemed unconstitutional. Under Brandenburg, laws that prohibit mere advocacy of terrorism would also be held to violate the First Amendment. The chapter concludes that much of the explanation for American free speech exceptionalism lies in the U.S. Supreme Court's extensive experience with free speech issues, particularly the lessons it learned from its failure to protect adequately dissent in the early part of the 20th century.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationExtreme Speech and Democracy
    PublisherOxford University Press
    ISBN (Print)9780191720673, 9780199548781
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 1 2009

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    doctrine
    Brandenburg
    ban
    regulation
    violation of the law
    hate
    Holocaust
    amendment
    Supreme Court
    terrorism
    democracy
    Law
    discourse
    experience
    Group

    Keywords

    • Advocacy of terrorism
    • American free speech exceptionalism
    • Brandenburg v. ohio
    • Content regulation
    • First amendment
    • Group defamation
    • Hate speech
    • Holocaust denial
    • Public discourse
    • Viewpoint discrimination

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Social Sciences(all)

    Cite this

    An Overview of American Free Speech Doctrine and its Application to Extreme Speech. / Weinstein, James.

    Extreme Speech and Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2009.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Weinstein, James. / An Overview of American Free Speech Doctrine and its Application to Extreme Speech. Extreme Speech and Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2009.
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