Abstract
Indirect reciprocity occurs when the cooperative behavior between two individuals is contingent on their previous behavior toward others. Previous theoretical analysis indicates that indirect reciprocity can evolve if individuals use an image-scoring strategy. In this paper, we show that, when errors are added, indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image-scoring strategy. However, if individuals use a standing strategy, then cooperation through indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily stable. These two strategies differ with respect to the information to which they attend. While image-scoring strategies only need attend to the actions of others, standing strategies also require information about intent. We speculate that this difference may shed light on the evolvability of indirect reciprocity. Additionally, we show that systems of indirect reciprocity are highly sensitive to the availability of information. Finally, we present a model which shows that if indirect reciprocity were to evolve, selection should also favor trusting behavior in relations between strangers.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 115-126 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of Theoretical Biology |
| Volume | 224 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 7 2003 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Altruism
- Cooperation
- Generalized exchange
- Image score
- Indirect reciprocity
- Reputation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
Cite this
A tale of two defectors : The importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity. / Panchanathan, Karthik; Boyd, Robert.
In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 224, No. 1, 07.09.2003, p. 115-126.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - A tale of two defectors
T2 - The importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
AU - Panchanathan, Karthik
AU - Boyd, Robert
PY - 2003/9/7
Y1 - 2003/9/7
N2 - Indirect reciprocity occurs when the cooperative behavior between two individuals is contingent on their previous behavior toward others. Previous theoretical analysis indicates that indirect reciprocity can evolve if individuals use an image-scoring strategy. In this paper, we show that, when errors are added, indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image-scoring strategy. However, if individuals use a standing strategy, then cooperation through indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily stable. These two strategies differ with respect to the information to which they attend. While image-scoring strategies only need attend to the actions of others, standing strategies also require information about intent. We speculate that this difference may shed light on the evolvability of indirect reciprocity. Additionally, we show that systems of indirect reciprocity are highly sensitive to the availability of information. Finally, we present a model which shows that if indirect reciprocity were to evolve, selection should also favor trusting behavior in relations between strangers.
AB - Indirect reciprocity occurs when the cooperative behavior between two individuals is contingent on their previous behavior toward others. Previous theoretical analysis indicates that indirect reciprocity can evolve if individuals use an image-scoring strategy. In this paper, we show that, when errors are added, indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image-scoring strategy. However, if individuals use a standing strategy, then cooperation through indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily stable. These two strategies differ with respect to the information to which they attend. While image-scoring strategies only need attend to the actions of others, standing strategies also require information about intent. We speculate that this difference may shed light on the evolvability of indirect reciprocity. Additionally, we show that systems of indirect reciprocity are highly sensitive to the availability of information. Finally, we present a model which shows that if indirect reciprocity were to evolve, selection should also favor trusting behavior in relations between strangers.
KW - Altruism
KW - Cooperation
KW - Generalized exchange
KW - Image score
KW - Indirect reciprocity
KW - Reputation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0042668671&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0042668671&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00154-1
DO - 10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00154-1
M3 - Article
C2 - 12900209
AN - SCOPUS:0042668671
VL - 224
SP - 115
EP - 126
JO - Journal of Theoretical Biology
JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology
SN - 0022-5193
IS - 1
ER -