A sybil-proof and time-sensitive incentive tree mechanism for crowdsourcing

Xiang Zhang, Guoliang Xue, Dejun Yang, Ruozhou Yu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Crowdsourcing incentive mechanism design has raised numerous interests from research communities in recent years. While most research focuses on contribution-based payment allocation, a solid crowdsourcing incentive mechanism should encourage users to both devote efforts to complete the task and refer other users to join into participation. In this paper, we adopt a data structure called incentive tree which has a unique advantage in incentivizing participants for solicitation. Furthermore, we consider the crowdsourcing scenario where the contribution model is submodular and time-sensitive, which is more realistic compared to the linear summation model adopted by previous works. Under this model, we design a reward mechanism based on the incentive tree, and prove that this mechanism satisfies several economic properties such as continuing contribution incentive, continuing solicitation incentive, θ-reward proportional to contribution, early contribution incentive, and sybil-proofness. We implemented our incentive mechanism and conducted extensive performance evaluations. The evaluation results confirm our theoretical analysis.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Print)9781479959525
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 23 2016
Event58th IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015 - San Diego, United States
Duration: Dec 6 2015Dec 10 2015

Other

Other58th IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015
CountryUnited States
CitySan Diego
Period12/6/1512/10/15

Fingerprint

incentive
Data structures
reward
Economics
time
linear model
research focus
evaluation
scenario
participation
community
performance
economics

Keywords

  • Crowdsourcing
  • Submodular Contribution
  • Sybil-proofness
  • Timesensitivity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Communication

Cite this

Zhang, X., Xue, G., Yang, D., & Yu, R. (2016). A sybil-proof and time-sensitive incentive tree mechanism for crowdsourcing. In 2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015 [7417272] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7417272

A sybil-proof and time-sensitive incentive tree mechanism for crowdsourcing. / Zhang, Xiang; Xue, Guoliang; Yang, Dejun; Yu, Ruozhou.

2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. 7417272.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Zhang, X, Xue, G, Yang, D & Yu, R 2016, A sybil-proof and time-sensitive incentive tree mechanism for crowdsourcing. in 2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015., 7417272, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 58th IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015, San Diego, United States, 12/6/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7417272
Zhang X, Xue G, Yang D, Yu R. A sybil-proof and time-sensitive incentive tree mechanism for crowdsourcing. In 2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. 7417272 https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7417272
Zhang, Xiang ; Xue, Guoliang ; Yang, Dejun ; Yu, Ruozhou. / A sybil-proof and time-sensitive incentive tree mechanism for crowdsourcing. 2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016.
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