A secure incentive protocol for mobile ad hoc networks

Yanchao Zhang; Wenjing Lou; Wei Liu; Yuguang Fang

doi:10.1007/s11276-006-6220-3

A secure incentive protocol for mobile ad hoc networks

Yanchao Zhang, Wenjing Lou, Wei Liu, Yuguang Fang

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

73 Scopus citations

Abstract

The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	569-582
Number of pages	14
Journal	Wireless Networks
Volume	13
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11276-006-6220-3
State	Published - Oct 2007
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Cooperation
Incentive
Mobile ad hoc networks
Security
Selfishness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Information Systems
Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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title = "A secure incentive protocol for mobile ad hoc networks",

abstract = "The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP.",

keywords = "Cooperation, Incentive, Mobile ad hoc networks, Security, Selfishness",

author = "Yanchao Zhang and Wenjing Lou and Wei Liu and Yuguang Fang",

note = "Funding Information: This work was supported in part by the U.S. Office of Naval Research under Young Investigator Award N000140210464 and under grant N000140210554.",

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T1 - A secure incentive protocol for mobile ad hoc networks

AU - Zhang, Yanchao

AU - Lou, Wenjing

AU - Liu, Wei

AU - Fang, Yuguang

N1 - Funding Information: This work was supported in part by the U.S. Office of Naval Research under Young Investigator Award N000140210464 and under grant N000140210554.

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N2 - The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP.

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KW - Security

KW - Selfishness

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