Abstract
The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 569-582 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Wireless Networks |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2007 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Cooperation
- Incentive
- Mobile ad hoc networks
- Security
- Selfishness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Information Systems
Cite this
A secure incentive protocol for mobile ad hoc networks. / Zhang, Yanchao; Lou, Wenjing; Liu, Wei; Fang, Yuguang.
In: Wireless Networks, Vol. 13, No. 5, 10.2007, p. 569-582.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - A secure incentive protocol for mobile ad hoc networks
AU - Zhang, Yanchao
AU - Lou, Wenjing
AU - Liu, Wei
AU - Fang, Yuguang
PY - 2007/10
Y1 - 2007/10
N2 - The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP.
AB - The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Incentive
KW - Mobile ad hoc networks
KW - Security
KW - Selfishness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34547532527&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=34547532527&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11276-006-6220-3
DO - 10.1007/s11276-006-6220-3
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:34547532527
VL - 13
SP - 569
EP - 582
JO - Wireless Networks
JF - Wireless Networks
SN - 1022-0038
IS - 5
ER -